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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW-THE EFFECT OF SECTION 8(b) (7)

[Vol. XXVII
ON PICKETING

IN AID OF A LAWFUL ECONOMIC STRIKE

Section 8(b) (7) of the National Labor Relations Act' restricts recognitional and organizational picketing.2 The statute
prohibits picketing, or a threat of picketing, by an uncertified
union when an object is recognition or organization in three
circumstances: (a) where the employer has "lawfully recognized" another labor organization and it is not appropriate to
raise a representation question under section 9(c) of the act,
(b) where a valid election has been conducted within the preceding twelve months, or (c) where such picketing has been conducted without a representation petition being filed within a
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrun-Griffin
Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1964). NLRA § 8(b)(7),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1964), added by the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agentsto picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any
employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an- employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees
"(A)
where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this
Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this
Act,
"(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
"(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided,
That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith,
without regard to the provisions of section 9(c) (1) or the absence
of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further,
That nothing in this subsection (C) shall be construed to prohibit any
pieketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public (including consumers) that an emiployer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect
of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods or not. to perform any services.
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed 'to permit any act which would
otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b)." (Emphasis added.)
2. " 'Organizational' picketing, which is directed at, enrolling employees into
the picketing" union, is sometimes distinguished from 'recognitional' picketing,
which exerts pressure directly on an employer in order to induce him to recogn'ze
the picketing union." Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five
on a Seesaw,, 30 U. CHi. I. REV. 78, 79 n.10 (1962). See generally, Dunau, Some
Aspects of the Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(7), 52 GEO. L.J. 220 (1904) ;
Cox, The Landruim-Griffin Act Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MxNN. L. REV. 257 (1959).
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reasonable period of time, not to exceed thirty days from com3
mencement.
Picketing to attain objects not included within the scope of
the statute is permissible. 4 For example, picketing does not include a recognitional object where it is designed to publicize
prevailing area standards, 5 to force reinstatement of discharged
employees, or to enforce compliance with an existing collective
bargaining agreement.7 Picketing to protest employer unfair
labor practices is permitted, except where the unfair labor practice is a refusal-to-bargain within the meaning of 8 (a) (5).8 If
the alleged unfair labor practice is a refusal-to-bargain, the

union must file an 8 (a) (5) charge; if the charge is subsequently
found to be meritorious, the picketing escapes the proscription
of 8(b) (7).9 Pending resolution of the 8(a) (5) charge, either
by dismissal or by an order requiring the employer to bargain,
picketing may lawfully continue. 10
There is little difficulty in determining applicability of
8(b) (7) when an initial object of picketing is recognition or
organization and thus clearly proscribed. But does the proscrip3. Further refinements to § 8(b) (7) (C) include: (1) a right to an expedited
election when an 8(b) (7) (C) charge is filed, and (2) the exemption of truthful
informational picketing, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce other cuployees not to pick up, deliver, or transport goods, or to perform services. A
picketing union may not invoke the expedited election procedure established by
the first proviso to § 8(b) (7) (C). C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1157 (1962).
4. "In other words, the thrust of all the section 8(b) (7) provisions is only
upon picketing for an object of recognition or organization, and not upon picketing
for other objects." Id. at 1159.
5. Claude Everett Constr. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962) ;Calumet Contractors
Ass'n, 133 N.L.R.B. 512, reversing 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961).
6. Mission Valley Inn, 140 N.L.R.B. 433 (1963) ; Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc.,
133 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1961), overruling Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
See also McLeod v. Local 140, Bedding Workers, 207 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
7. Sullivan Electric Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1964) ; Downtowner Motor Inns,
146 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1964).
8. Mission Valley Inn, 140 N.L.R.B. 433 (1963) ; Bachman Furniture Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 670 (1961). See also a reference to the ample legislative history supporting this proposition in C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1168,
n.29 (1962).
NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 15S(a)(5) (1964) provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a)."
9. Dayton Typographical Union v. NLRB, 326 F,2d 634, 646-49 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
Dayton contains an excellent discussion of the legislative history of
§ 8(b) (7). See also C.A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1166 n.24
(1962).
10. See C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1163-67 (1962), discussed
in Note, 47 MIN,. L. REv. 1013, 1028 (1963) : "The result in the Blinne case
may be justified on the ground that a meritorious charge under section 8(a) (5)
indicates that the union probably possesses majority status."
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tion extend to initially legitimate picketing subsequently acquiring an additional recognitional object? For example, after
negotiations for a new contract have failed to produce agreement, suppose a presently recognized union initiates an economic
strike and pickets the employer in aid of collective bargaining
demands. If the union's objective at the inception of picketing
is valid and not within the scope of 8(b) (7), would the employer's replacement of a majority of economic strikers with
non-union personnel add a recognitional object and invoke the
sanctions of 8 (b) (7) ?
In Sullivan Electric Co.," the National Labor Relations Board
apparently laid the foundation for a negative answer to this
question in 8(b)'(7) (C) cases. In Sullivan, the employer entered into a bargaining agreement with the labor councils of two
California counties. During the contract term, two councilaffiliated unions, unaware of the' contract, commenced area
standards picketing of a Sullivan construction project. When
informed of the contract's existence, the unions altered the picket
signs to allege a breach of the agreement.1 2 The Board dismissed
Sullivan's 8(b) (7) (C) charge against the picketing unions on
the basis of a finding that the sole object of the picketing was
to enforce compliance with an existing collective bargaining
contract, but added:
"Nevertheless, after analyzing the overall Congressional purpose behind the enactment of the section, we are convinced
that the words 'recognize or bargain' were not intended to be
read as encompassing two separate and unrelated terms.
Rather, we believe they were intended to proscribe picketing
having as its target forcing or requiring an employer's initial
acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of
his employees.' When viewed in this posture, it is clear that
Sullivan had recognized and extended bargaining rights to
the Respondents long before the disputed picketing commenced here and that such picketing therefore was not
designed to attain those statutory objectives.' 3 (Emphasis
added.)
11. 146 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1964).
12. Initially, the picket signs read: "Sullivan Electric Co. Not Paying Prevailing Wages and Benefits."; but were changed to: "Sullivan Electric Unfair in
Breach of Contract with Santa Barbara Building and Construction Trades Counciland Affiliated Unions, AFL-CIO."
13. Sullivan Electric Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1087 (1964). The Board cited
C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
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The initial acceptance concept announced in Sullivan was not
necessary for the decision, 14 and problems involving the extent
of its application have arisen in later cases.' 5
In the first case after Sullivan considering the question,
Penello v. Warehouse Employees Union, 16 a long series of satisfactory collective bargaining agreements was interrupted when,
at the end of two negotiating sessions for a new contract, the
union walked out, filed a refusal-to-bargain charge, and began
picketing the employer's premises. 17 The picketing was in aid
of a lawful economic strike initiated to enforce the union's
bargaining demands. Thereafter, the employer hired permanent
replacements for all strikers and withdrew recognition, alleging
that the union no longer represented a- majority of the employees.1 8 The Regional Director sought to enjoin the union from
picketing apparently violative of 8 (b) (7) (C), arguing that there
was "reasonable cause"' 9 to believe that the picketing had acquired an added object of recognition after the hiring of nonunion replacements and subsequent withdrawal of recognition by
14. "We find, in agreement with the trial examiner, that the sole objective
of the Respondent's allegedly unlawful picketing was to compel Sullivan to comply
with an existing valid collective-bargaining contract between the parties." Sullivan
Electric Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1087 (1964).
15. "This decision . .. adds a new condition to section 8(b) (7) (C), requiring
that a union picket for initial recognition or bargaining to be within the purview
of the statute." Comment, 38 TEMPLE L.Q. 433, 439 (1965).
16. 230 F. Supp. 900 (D. Md. 1964), noted 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 156 (1964).
17. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) provides: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a) (3)."
NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964) provides: "Nothing in this Act, except
as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
Professor Lesnick has concluded that the rights granted in §§ 7 and 13 are
not to be abridged, except in the face of a clear congressional mandate. Lesnick,
The Gravarnen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUm. L. REV. 1363, 1398-1403
(1962). The problem arises in the interplay of §§ 7 and 13 and others, e.g.,
8(b) (4) and 8(b) (7), which provide certain restrictions on strikes and picketing.
18. An employer violates NLRA § 8(a) (3) if he discharges economic strikers
before replacing them. Economic strikers are entitled to the return of their jobs
if they are not permanently replaced prior to their unconditional offer to return
to work. But, an employer may deny reinstatement to economic strikers who have
been permanently replaced prior to their unconditional offer to return to work.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.-333 (1938).
19. NLRA § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964) provides that the Regional
Director shall seek a -temporary restraining order from the United States District
Court whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that a charge alleging a violation of § 8(b) (7) is true.
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the employer. 20 The union contended that Sullivan precluded injunction since the picketing was lawfully commenced and did
not, at that time, have as an object requiring the "initial acceptance" of the union as the employees' bargaining representative. The court rejected the initial acceptance argument and
found the picketing to be recognitional, 2' but held it would not
22
be "just and proper" to grant the requested injunction.
In Whitaker Paper Co., 23 the Penello case came b2fore the
Board for final disposition. The Board stated: "The issue presented here is whether or not picketing, lawfully commenced
and maintained during a strike by a recognized incumbent statutory representative in support of a collective bargaining dispute with respect to economic issues, was converted to picketing
for a recognitional objective within the meaning of section
8(b) (7) (C) merely because the picketed company replaced the
striking employees. ' 24 Citing the Sullivan language quoted before and disagreeing with the district court, the Board concluded that picketing lawfully commenced in aid of an economic
strike was not converted to recognitional picketing merely by
20. In a prior action, the Regional Director sought a temporary injunction on
the ground that the picketing had acquired a recognitional object automatically
upon the employer's replacement of the economic strikers and subsequent withdrawal of recognition. The court denied the injunction and held that such a recognitional object could not be established automatically. Rather, a requirement that
there was reasonable cause to believe the picketing had acquired a recognitional
object was necessary. Penello v. Warehouse Employees Union, 230 F. Supp.
892 (D. Md. 1964).
21. In commenting on Sullivan, the court said: "This Court agrees with the
Board that 'the words "recognize or bargain" were not intended to be read as
encompassing two separate and unrelated terms.' And this Court believes that the
statute was intended to proscribe picketing having as its target forcing or requiring
an employer's acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of his employees. This Court questions, however, the justification for inserting the word
'initial' before the words 'acceptance of the union'. The word 'initial' was not
necessary for the decision of that case; the employer there involved was at all
material times obliged to recognize the union, since there was an unexpired contract between them. The Board did not cite any legislative history or other
reason or authority in support of the dictum. This Court finds no justification
in the statute, the legislative history or the cases interpreting the statute, for limiting sec. 8(b) (7) to picketing having as its target forcing or requiring an eaployer's initial acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of his employees." Penello v. Warehouse Employees Union, 230 F. Supp. 900, 903-04 (D.
Md. 1964).
22. Id. at 905: "The final question is whether issuance of the requested injunction would be 'just and proper'. In the ordinary case under see. 10(1), it
is clear that injunctive relief is necessary to achieve the Congressional objective.
(Citations omitted.) In the present case it is not cleai, that such relief is either
necessary to achieve that purpose or that it would be just and proper. Both
Whitaker and its employees have had the right to call for an election under
9(c), before or after October 16, 1963, when Whitaker first challenged respondent's
representation of its employees."
23. 149 N.L.R.B. 731 (1964).
24. Id. at 734.
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an employer's act of hiring permanent non-union replacements
for economic strikers and then raising a representation question. 25 This conclusion was grounded on legislative history indicating that a prime purpose of 8 (b) (7) (C) was to abolish
"blackmail picketing, '26 rather than to encompass the situation
there presented. Particular reliance was placed on Congressman
Griffin's statement:
"At the outset, it should be clear that there is no provision
in any of the bills which impairs or affects the right of organized employees to go on strike for better wages and work-

ing conditions-and to picket in connection with such a
2 7

strike."

In subsequent 8 (b) (7) (C) cases dealing with this problem, the
Board has consistently applied the initial acceptance analysis
28
developed in Whitaker.
However, the Board has abandoned the Whitaker requirement that picketing for recognition must be an initial object,
when the issue is presented in an 8(b) (7) (B) case. If after
the employer's replacement of economic strikers with non-union
personnel, a decertification petition 2 ) is filed resulting in an
election which the union loses, a different conclusion is reached
when an 8 (b) (7) (B) charge is filed.
In Lawrence TypographicalUnion,30 the Board held that con25. After Whitaker, presumably Regional Directors will no longer seek temporary injunctions under § 10(1) in such cases, since the requirement of reasonable cause to believe that the charge of an 8(b) (7) (C) violation was true would
be absent.
26. 2

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY

OF

THE

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

REPORTING

AND

DIscLOsuRE ACT OF 1959, 994, 1182, 1518, 1523, 1615, 1630 (1959).
27. Id. at 1567.
28. Jones & Jones, 154 N.L.R.B. 1598 (1965); Frank Wheatley Pump &
Valve Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 565 (1964); Deaton Truck Line, 150 N.L.R.B.
514 (1964).
29. NLRA § 9(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964) provides that an employee, group of employees, individual or labor organization acting iu their behalf
may request an election to establish that an individual or labor organization currently certified or recognizcd is no longer the employees' choice as their bargaining
representative. Thus, a recognized union need not be certified to be the subject
of a decertification election.
30. 158 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1966). Here, the employer and union had entered
into a contract covering composing room and mailing roomemployees. The contract expired on May 31, 1961, and after unsuccessful negotiations for a new contract the union struck and picketed the plant, commencing on September 19, 1961.
Negotiations continued and the employer maintained production with replacements.
A decertification petition alleging that the union no longer represented the mailing
room employees was filed January 15, 1963, and a similar petition covering the
composing room employees was filed January 21, 1963. A hearing was held on
both petitions on May 7, 1963, and an election was subsequently conducted on
August 28, 1963. After a number of proceedings resolving the validity of the
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tinued picketing after loss of a decertification election constituted seeking a forbidden recognitional object within the meaning of 8(b) (7) (B). That the picketing was lawfully commenced in aid of an economic strike was of no moment. 31 Whitaker's
initial acceptance argument was held not controlling3 2 because
of the different purposes served by 8(b) (7) (B) and 8(b) (7)
(C). 33 The Board reasoned that 8(b) (7) (B) was designed to
provide stability for the twelve-month period during which section 9(c) (3) prevented another election by prohibiting recognitional picketing. The fact that a union lawfully commenced
picketing prior to an election is not compelling, because once the
employees have voiced their opinion by rejecting the union they
are entitled to protection from recognitional picketing after the
election.
Prior to the enactment of 8(b) (7), a similar interpretation
of 8(b) (4) (C) 34 was reached in Western Auto Supply. 35 Section 8 (b) (4) (C) provides protection from picketing only if the
union is certified as the employees' bargaining representative,
whereas 8 (b) (7) (B) provides protection once an election is held,
regardless of the outcome. In Western Auto, the union struck
and picketed the employer after failure to agree on a new contract. Over a period of time, the employer hired a number of
election, on August 3, 1964, the Regional Director certified that the union was no
longer the bargaining representative of tie employees.
Thereafter, the employer
filed an 8(b) (7) (B) charge.
31. Tile Board has previously reached this conclusion in 8(b) (7) (B) cases
Stoltze Land & Lumber Co., 156
without considering lawful commencement,
N.L.R.B. 388 (1965); Jamestown Sterling Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 474 (1964),
enf. den. on dther grounds, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964).
32. The district court, considering the Regional Director's request for a temporary injunction under § 10(1), reached the same decision. Injunction granted.
Sperry v. Lawrence Typographical Union, 2.38 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1964).
33. "The purpose of Section 8(b) (7) (B) was, not to deal with so-called
'blackmail picketing' but, to provide stability for the 12-month period during
which section 9(c) (3) of the Act barred a second Board election for the same
unit by protecting the employer and employees during that period against the pressores of recognitional and organizational picketing in a situation where neither the
picketing union nor any other union was selected as the employees' bargaining
Lawrence Typographical Union, 158
representative in a valid Board election."
N.L.R.B. No. 134, 62 L.Rk.R.M. 1243, 1245 (1966).
"It shall
34. NLRA § S(b) (4) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1964):
to
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(4) (i)
engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike
or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is . . . (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize
or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9."
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permanent replacements for the economic strikers. A second
union then filed a representation petition and in the following

election was certified as the new bargaining representative. The
Board held that the striking union violated 8 (b) (4) (C) by continued post-election picketing despite the fact that its sole initial
object was the legitimate one of seeking a favorable new con-

tract.
Additional support for the application of 8(b) (7) (B) to
reach the Lawrence picketing, despite lawful commencement,
is found in the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Drivers Local
Union (Curtis Bros.), 3 There the Court rejected the Board's
contention that 8(b) (1) (A) ' 7 prohibited peaceful post-election
picketing, lawfully commenced in aid of an economic strike. Although the majority relied primarily on legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act indicating that 8 (b) (1) (A) was not designed
to encompass "peaceful" picketing, they buttressed that decision with a reference to the recent passage of 8 (b) (7), arguing
that it represented a comprehensive new code governing recognitional picketing.s The dissenters concluded that the new statutory provision seemed to squarely cover the circumstances
there presented, and voted to remand the case to the Board for
39
reconsideration.
Similarly, Whitaker has not been followed when the issue
of lawful commencement is presented in an 8(b) (7) (A) case.
35. 93 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1951).
36. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
37. NLRA § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (1) (A) (1964) provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7."
38. 362 U.S. 274, 281-90 (1960). The Court resolved a "split" in the lower
courts on the applicability of 8(b) (1) (A). The District of Columbia Circuit
had concluded 8(b) (1) (A) was inapplicable to "peaceful" post-election picketing,
lawfully commenced prior to the election. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 274
F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). On the other hand, the
Fourth Circuit had enforced a Board decision applying 8(b) (1) (A) to such picketing. NLRB v. United Rubber Workers (O'Sullivan Rubber Corp.)., 269 F.2d
694 (4th Cir. 1959), rcv'd, 362 U.S. 329 (1960).
Chief Judge Sobeloff, dissenting in O'Sullivan, recognized the problem of restricting initially legitimate
picketing. "In dealing with this problem Congress may or may not recognize a
difference between a case where the union has never represented the employees
and continues to picket after they have rejected it in an election and another case,
where, as here, the employees represented by a certified union have gone out on
an economic strike and been replaced by a new force of employees who vote
the union out in an election based upon a decertification petition. In the latter
situation the union may be thought by Congress to have equities which warrant
;protection." 269 F.2d at 703. Nevertheless, such a distinction was not drawn
in § 8(b) (7), passed shortly after the decision in O'Sullivan.
39. 362 U.S. 274, 292 (190).

852
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The Board has recently held that it'is not material that the
picketing union lawfully commenced its activity prior to the
employer's recognition of another union. 40 Thus, when picketing
in aid of an economic strike continues beyond the employer's replacement of strikers, it is protected from only an 8(b) (7) (C)
charge. If 8(b) (7) (A) or 8(b) (7) (B) is applicable, lawful
commencement of the picketing is immaterial.
It is arguable that the Whitaker distinction exempting lawfully commenced picketing from the proscription of 8 (b) (7) (C),
where it would not otherwise be exempted from application of
8(b) (7) (B) or 8(b) (7) (A), is unwarranted. The 'Board's
argument assumes that since 8 (b) (7) (C) was intended to stop
blackmail picketing, it cannot be used to reach picketing lawfully
commenced in aid of an economic strike. 'Nevertheless, though
the evil prompting the statute may have been blackmail picketing, "the clear language of the statute, as it was ultimately
' 41
enacted, . . . goes far beyond mere correction of that evil."
Indeed in a decision rendered just prior to Whitaker, Bartlett &
Co., 42 the Board found a violation of 8(b) (7) (C) under circumstances identical to those presented in Whitaker, without discussing the fact that the initial objects of the picketing did not include recognition or organization. However, a literal application of the statute leaves much to be desired. "In the absence
of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary, these
provisions [Sections 7 and 13] caution against reading statutory
prohibitions as embracing employee activities to pressure their
own employers into improving the employees' wages, hours, and
43
working conditions."
It is submitted that there are significant merits to the
Whitaker requirement that recognition be an "initial object"
before picketing will be proscribed by 8 (b) (7) (C). Absent the
initial object requirement, a literal application of 8 (b) (7) (C)
would produce unwarranted variations in the treatment of "certified" unions and unions merely "recognized" as the employees'
bargaining representative. Whereas 8 (b) (7) (A) and 8 (b) (7)
(B) presently reach both categories, 8(b) (7) (C) would reach
40. Harlan FuelCo., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1966)'; Seagraves Coal Co., 160
N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1966).
41. Dayton Typographical Union v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
42. 141 N.L.R.B. 974 (1963).
43. National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 35 U.S. L. WEEK 4349, 4358
(April 17, 1967).

19671

NOTES

only the latter,, since the former are specifically excepted under
the terms of the statute. This distinction is not justified by
any meritorious policy consideration. Moreover, the absence
of the initial object requirement would mean that a good faith
union attempting to comply with 8 (b) (7) (C) would be required
to guess when picketing acquired a recognitional object in order
to file a representation petition within the thirty-day limitation. On the other hand, under the present rule, employer and
employees are amply protected from unwanted recognitional
picketing. Whenever the addition of a sufficient number of
permanent non-union replacements for economic strikers raises
a representation question involving the union's majority, they
need only file a petition for a decertification election to resolve
the issue. If the union is decertified, then under the decision
in Lawrence, 8 (b) (7) (B) would be applicable, and further postelection picketing would be prohibited. A literal application of
8 (b) (7) (C) would work substantial hardship on a union engaged
in a lawful economic strike, in the teeth of Congressman Griffin's assurance that there was no intent to impair that right
with the enactment of 8 (b) (7).
William C. Kaufman III
.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BURDEN OF PROOF-APPLICABILITY
IN ELECTRICITY CASES
Plaintiff, manager of a cotton gin, noticed the lights in the
gin flickering. While attempting to turn off all electric power
at the fuse box, he received an electrical shock. When' he staggered out of the building, defendant's power cable serving the
gin broke and fell to the ground, causing flash burns to his eyes.
Held, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, and "the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the accident was
caused by something for which it is not responsible."' Since defendant failed to meet this burden, judgment for plaintiff was
upheld. Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 191 So. 2d 338
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than a rule of circumstantial
evidence. In a situation where the doctrine is properly applied,
1. Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 191 So. 2d 338, 341 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966).

